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The importance and sensitivity of personal health information has led to an increased 
focus on privacy protection measures as personal health records are digitized. Systems 
and legislation are rapidly adapting to meet both technology and consumer concerns. An 
application of the Privacy Management Reference Model & Methodology (PMRM) to 
assess HL7 Consent Directive Use Cases will provide policy makers, health care 
providers, and consenters alike the ability to assess the effectiveness of current practices 
when it comes to the interoperability and the protection of Individually Identifiable 
Health Information. A solid foundation will be provided to recommend how all 
stakeholders can work together to improve the consent processes, and ultimately improve 
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Ch 1 – Introduction 
 
Few things are as important to an individual as his or her health and wellness. Health is 
the catalyst for all one hopes to do and achieve in their life, and as a society healthcare 
consumes a significant portion of our resources. It is a source of considerable focus for 
both governments and individuals. 
 
Privacy in the healthcare field is particularly important due to the highly personal nature 
of health records and the potential for unlawful misuse of health information to deny 
access to jobs and promotion opportunities. Privacy concerns and issues have only been 
heightened as the search for delivery improvements and efficiency has led to the 
digitization of health records. The reason for this digitization is quite straightforward: the 
aggregation and improved data flows for health care providers. This leads to greater 
consistency, accuracy and efficiency. The digitization of these records does, however, 
lead to increased concern-surrounding privacy, and who should have access to what data. 
 
Governments have recognized the privacy implications of increased data sharing as 
technology evolves, and have created legislation to reflect this quickly evolving reality. 
However, as each jurisdiction is responsible for creating its own legislation the 





1.1 - Objectives 
This paper will examine the patient consent process as it relates to the sharing of personal 
health records between health care providers in Nova Scotia, Canada. This analysis will 
be conducted using the methodology of the Privacy Management Resource Model 
(PMRM). The HL7 Use Case takes an in-depth look at the actors, systems, and processes 
involved in Privacy Consent Directives and will be reviewed through the PMRM lens. 
The analysis will reveal some of the strengths and weaknesses of the PMRM 


















Ch 2 - Literature Review 
 
The impact of digitized health records has been the subject of increased study and 
scrutiny in recent years. The aggregation and improved information flows associated with 
the collection of massive amounts of sensitive health information has amplified concerns 
over privacy. While most agree this is a major step forward for the efficiency and 
accuracy of the vital data that researchers and health care professionals use to improve 
patient care, legitimate questions arise about how to strike the delicate balance between a 
patient’s right to privacy and the provider’s need for information. The impact of this 
debate is being felt legislatively, socially, and economically. 
 
2.1 – Legislation: 
Throughout Canada, there has been recognition on the part of governments and policy 
makers about the importance of, and right to, privacy protection in light of an increasingly 
digital environment. Therefore a Pan-Canadian Health Information Privacy and 
Confidentiality Framework was established among provincial and territorial leaders in 
order “to respond to Canadians' privacy and confidentiality expectations and to suggest a 
harmonized set of core provisions for the collection, use and disclosure of personal health 
information in both the publicly and privately funded sectors” (Health Canada, 2005, 
paragraph 2). As it is the provinces that administer health care in Canada, this cooperation 




The United States Department of Health and Human Services came forth with Standards 
for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information. Part of the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, it set national standards for the protection of 
certain health information in regard to use and disclosure. “A major goal of the Privacy 
Rule is to assure that individuals’ health information is properly protected while allowing 
the flow of health information needed to provide and promote high quality health care and 
to protect the public's health and well being” (Firouzan & McKinnon, 2004, p. 3). This 
legislation pertains to providers and clients, and sets forth very specific parameters 
around what type of information is covered and on what the information can be used on. 
 
In Canada, the “gold standard” of personal health privacy legislation is considered to be 
Ontario’s Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) (Cavoukian, 2010 slide 
1). First implemented in 2004, it was “the only health sector privacy legislation that was 
declared to be substantially similar to Canada’s federal private sector privacy legislation, 
PIPEDA, in 2005.” (Cavoukian, 2010 slide 7). 
PHIPA establishes rules surrounding the collection, use, and disclosure of health 
information; codifies a client’s right to confidentiality and establishes accountability and 
remedies for breaches (Cavoukian, 2010 slide 6)). Where PHIPA differs is in its use of 
the “Circle of Care”. This represents a clarification surrounding the ability of health 
information custodians to share information for health care purposes. 
This legislation has been widely reviewed and mimicked. For instance, the Government 
of New Brunswick created a task force on personal health information, which 
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recommended the implementation of legislation regarding personal health information, 
based principally on Ontario’s PHIPA (Cavoukian, 2010, slide 11). In Nova Scotia, the 
Personal Health Information Act was announced in late 2009, and enacted in 2010. It 
brought together many different privacy protections that exist under the law into one 
document. In May of 2012, the Government of Nova Scotia brought amendments to the 
legislation to the floor of the House of Assembly. These changes will take effect in June 
2013. Among them was the recognition of the “Circle of Care”, acknowledging 
knowledgeable implied consent as a model for delivery. Other changes also included the 
ability to revoke consent; the implementation of a Review Officer; institution of a 
complaints policy; and enforcement measures for policy violators (Nova Scotia Personal 
Health Information Act, 2012). 
This shows that Nova Scotia, while later than Ontario’s “gold standard” legislation, is 
quickly catching up to an emerging consensus and adopting best practices from other 
jurisdictions. 
 
To meet these legislative guidelines requires changes to administrative, technical, and 
physical processes and equipment (Firouzan et al. 2004, p6). Part of this compliance 
process is clear and frequent communication with clients to ensure they know the 
necessity of the change; training employees for the new systems; and in larger institutions 
the hiring of a compliance officer is necessary. A 2004 study of healthcare facilities in 
Pennsylvania found that the majority of facilities were simply unable to meet the 
specified compliance timelines (Firouzan et al. 2004 p. 8). This shows that there remain 
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significant challenges both in terms of stakeholder buy-in and logistics in order to 
implement new systems and operations for digitization compliance. Ultimately, 
organizational support and commitment is a key plank in compliance, as employees better 
recognize the importance of the change, and they are more likely to prove the necessary 
resources (Johnson & Warkentin, 2008, p. 11). 
 
2.2 – Economic & sociotechnical challenges 
Appari and Johnson, in their publication The Current State of Research say that even 
though many of these regulations and frameworks have been in place for several years, 
there is still a lack of clarity surrounding them. Accordingly, this creates a greater threat 
of breach from within than from external threats. Simply put, employees do not 
understand the requirements. This is due, in part, to the economic and technical hurdles 
associated with more effective access controls. Moving forward, they suggest more 
collaboration is required between policy makers and stakeholder groups to increase 
interoperability and compliance. 
 
This leads to the importance of effective system design, which is a dynamic process as 
technology continues to evolve rapidly. Improvements are always necessary to ensure 
compliance and improved information flows as well (Russ et al. 2011). Issues of flow and 
interoperability are necessary so the information can be transferred easily while meeting 
the privacy requirements (Heinze, Birkle, Köster & Bergh, 2011, p. 3). Much has been 
written about the need for consultation and stakeholder engagement, as the distinct goals 
of all groups need to be accounted for and factored into the design. Better and more 
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representative designs will create greater efficiency, compliance, and trust in the system. 
It is an ongoing effort. 
 
In addition to regulatory compliance and system integrity, there is the issue of public trust 
and confidence in the disclosure of sensitive information. Publicizing individually 
identifiable health information could have social or economic implications for the client 
(Laric, Pitta & Katsanis, 2009, p. 1). That is, health issues and choices made by 
individuals, if made public or discovered by unauthorized stakeholders, could cause 
personal tension or duress in their respective communities or impact career prospects. For 
such reasons, it is natural that individuals like to protect privacy and have confidence in 
the systems put in place. Privacy policies are a known way to build trust, but it is vital 
that these agreements must be comprehendible by the patients. Overly technical, 
overwhelming policies serve to confuse patients and create more apprehension (Vail, 
Earp & Antón, 2008, p. 451). More emphasis must be placed on the consumers 
throughout the process to achieve buy-in and understanding of the implications. 
 
2.3 Standards to support privacy process implementations 
The move to digitize health information has led to the collaboration of many scholars and 
stakeholders to create standards that make the flow of information for accurate, efficient, 
and protected. These standards are incredibly complex and detailed, with an over-arching 




One such standard, Health Level 7 (HL7), refers to the movement to develop international 
interoperability standards for health information systems. In Canada, Canada Health 
Infoway represents HL7. An independent, government-funded organization that sets out 
to accelerate the digitization of health records across the country. Ultimately 
interoperability will increase access, efficiency and effectiveness of the healthcare system 
in Canada (Canada Health Infoway, 2005, p. 29). 
 
Canada Health Infoway has also come forth with privacy and security requirements for 
electronic health records. These are intended to protect the privacy of the individual and 
also uphold the integrity, accessibility and interoperability of the system. This, of course, 
is a delicate balance. On one hand, excessive restrictions and limitations prevents the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the data flows, while too much information being made 
available to too many would violate privacy legislation and undermine public trust. 
 
Another standard is known as the Healthcare Information Technology Standards Panel 
(HITSP), which also aims to improve and increase standardization efforts for technology 
in the field in the United States. It sets forth standards for stakeholders to follow to 
achieve its interoperability goals as well. 
 
Operating under the mandate of the US Department of Health and Human Services, 
HITSP put forth recommendations surrounding the consent process as it relates to the use 
and disclosure of personal health information. Criteria determining the basis upon consent 
being granted are: provider roles, operation required for the data, purpose of use, 
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condition or state client is in, time period under which information can be used, and the 
context that it can be shared (Health Information Technology Standards Panel report, 
2009, p. 21). All conformance guidelines for HITSP as they relate to consent process 
standards fit within the over-arching goal of interoperability. 
 
While there are different standards and different organizations creating the frameworks, 
the underlying goal remains the same: the creation of systems and processes that achieve 
a level of interoperability that improves the level of care received by patients. The holistic 
view taken by these organizations upholds the ability to embed privacy and consent 
designs while maintaining functionality. 
 
2.4 - Models & Methodologies for embedding privacy in processes 
There is an emerging mindset that privacy should not only be respected and codified in 
legislation when it comes to the use of personal health information, but it should be a 
cornerstone of information systems and processes moving forward. Dr. Anne Cavoukian, 
Ontario’s Information and Privacy Commissioner has championed the embedding of 
privacy processes, and her work on both the Privacy by Design framework and Privacy 
Impact Assessments has generated acclaim, and is becoming widely adopted. 
 
Privacy by Design (PbD) is a framework which seeks to influence technology design, 
business practices, and physical infrastructure by embedding privacy protection at its 
core. Since its inception in the early 1990s it has generated a great deal of attention 
acclaim, and in 2010 PbD was recognized as a new global privacy standard by 
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International Data Privacy and Protection Commissioners (Cavoukian, 2010, s. 19). This 
results in these principles having great influence on policy frameworks around the world. 
 
Dr. Cavoukian has said that technologies can either be used to protect privacy or erode it, 
and that’s why such a framework and outlook is important to establish. At its core PbD 
holds 7 principles: 
1. Proactive, not reactive & preventative not remedial 
2. Privacy as a default setting 
3. Privacy embedded into design 
4. Full functionality: positive sum, not zero sum 
5. End-to-end security: full life cycle protection 
6. Visibility and transparency: keep it open 
7. Respect for user privacy: keep it user centric 
 
These principles are relevant and apply to multiple levels of stakeholders. As such, it 
seeks to “Build a culture of privacy” (Cavoukian, 2010, s. 22). This means it encourages 
organizations to look beyond mere compliance and toward a culture of trust with well-
trained and respectful employees, that in order to be successful all stakeholders must 
embrace the importance of privacy and recognize all have an role to play in enhancing its 
safeguards. 
 
Central to PbD is the concept of data minimization. This is both a policy and a mindset 
under which health care providers would operate on a “need to know basis”. That is, 
11 
 
collecting only what information is relevant to the service provided, and the limitation of 
the disclosure and sharing of information if existing data will serve the intended purpose. 
Ultimately minimized data collection and flows are an important part of protecting the 
client’s personal health information. 
 
Dr. Cavoukian also writes about Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs). A PIA is a risk 
analysis tool. It relates to the individual health information privacy stemming from new 
systems, technologies or practices.  
 
PIAs serve as a way for health information custodians to assess how they are adhering to 
privacy regulations and legislation. The intent is to go beyond simple compliance, but to 
recognize the importance of privacy and be able to be aware of how changes may impact 
individual privacy before those changes occur. It features a lengthy questionnaire, which 
focuses on two areas: organizational privacy management practices and the information 
system and technology involved (Cavoukian, 2010 p. 1). It is not only the technical 
systems in place that are important, but also the organizational practices relating to 
information sharing and access that can have an impact on privacy. These criteria and 
questions were created by a group of former Information & Privacy Commissioners from 
Canada and abroad (Cavoukian, 2010, p. 6). These PIAs must be thorough and give a full 
account of the systems in place and the processes associated with the collection and use 




Both the Privacy by Design framework and the Privacy Impact Assessments work in 
concert with each other to influence the embedding of privacy processes in health care 
systems and operations. These techniques serve as a starting point and assessment 
mechanism to ensure that privacy protection is at the forefront in healthcare, and can be 
bolstered as technology develops, not diminished. 
 
 
2.5 Consent process for the release of private health data 
The consent process is the point at which existing concerns about privacy and existing 
cognitive biases on the part of the clients converge with regulatory compliance and health 
information system design. It is the critical juncture of the process, where the client 
comes face-to-face with the systems and processes designed to protect his or her personal 
health information. This will frame the use and flow of this information moving forward. 
 
According to Canada Health Infoway’s Electronic Health Record (EHR) Privacy and 
Security Requirements document, “Laws may require express, implied or deemed consent 
for specific collections, uses and disclosures of PHI (personal health information)” 
(Canada Health Infoway, 2005, p. 24). Expressed consent is when it is made clear by the 
client, through a privacy consent directive or another means, where and when certain 
information can be utilized. Implied consent is when, through actions on the part of the 
client or through interactions with the health care provide, it becomes clear that the 
utilization of certain information is necessary. Finally, deemed consent is what providers 




Of course, a new ethical standard is sought in these circumstances, and the HL7 
guidelines regarding consent contain a number of privacy requirements to meet the 
specifications of the standard. They are as follows: 
- Obtain knowledgeable consent: This is not only to meet legal requirements, but to 
reach a new ethical standard. This will have the patient fully aware of her/her 
rights to change and revoke certain aspects, and how information will flow. 
- Record consent in Point of Service system (POS): These point of service systems 
are connected to electronic health records infrastructure, and accordingly the 
recording of consent would register in the system. 
- Associate consent with Personal Health Information in Point of Service System: 
the transmission of the consent directives must happen in consistent form with the 
health records infrastructure. 
- Record consent in health record infrastructure: the health records infrastructure 
must record consent directives in such a way that jurisdictional regulations can be 
applied. 
- Associate consent directives with personal health information in electronic health 
infrastructure: In the processing of this data a connection between the PCD and 
personal health records must be maintained. Also, when violated, the 
infrastructure must be able to block transmission of data and notify user. 
- Log application of consent directives: the health records infrastructure must be 
able to log when access is overridden or prohibited, and alert compliance officers 
within the organization. 
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- Implications of consent directives must be known: make patients/clients aware of 
the impact of limiting access to personal health records, like the locking or 
masking of personal health information. 
- Maintain a record of substitute decision maker’s identity 
- Ensure there is no coerced consent: Authorization must not be a condition of 
service. 
These processes involve both technical and operational aspects. The guidelines show how 
tight the parameters are becoming in order to uphold these important standards. Through 
stakeholder consultations, these requirements have been refined and improved upon. The 
consent process is a critical juncture for the privacy requirements to be upheld and 
refined. It forms the foundation upon which the ultimate success of privacy protection 
measures will ultimately be determined. 
 
The state of digitizing health records, and the public confidence that is a must to underpin 
it, is rapidly evolving. While regulations and laws are now in place to protect privacy and 
provide clarity for acceptable uses of IIHI, the elements of system design, public trust, 
and compliance are far from settled. While there is a recognition by all parties and 
stakeholders that this is an involved and complex process, much still needs to be done to 
secure systems and information flows and to educate both the public and system users 
about the parameters. Only through collaboration and mutual understanding can these 
issues be meaningfully addressed. 
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Ch 3 – Methodology 
 
This project uses the international Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards’ (OASIS) Privacy Management Reference Model and 
Methodology (PMRM) to fully explicate the HL7 consent management process to all 
stakeholders (see Appendix A). Industry, consultants, academics, and other stakeholders 
have developed PMRM as a method to comprehend and assess privacy management 
cases, and select appropriate processes and services that support established privacy 
controls. 
 
The establishment of the PMRM model comes at a time when personal information is 
increasingly found on networked and interconnected platforms. This information sharing 
across new platforms creates a complex regulatory environment due to the 
interconnectivity of the domains and jurisdictions. PMRM helps to wade through the 
complexity which results from inconsistent and conflicting regulations that occur across 
domains and leads to informed policy development and system design that will be both 
predictable and trusted by all stakeholders. Below is the PMRM conceptual model, 





Figure 1. The PMRM Model. [Adopted from Sabo et al, 2012.] 
The Privacy Management Analysis (PMA) and any Privacy Impact Assessments (PIA) 
that come out of applying PMRM help facilitate collaboration between all types of 
stakeholders: from system architects and developers, to policy makers and business 
owners. Ultimately, the results and analysis are applicable to all involved. 
 
3.1 – Analysis of use cases 
The PMRM methodology includes sections and tasks for the purpose of analyzing various 
use cases. When specifically applied to the HL7 Consent Directive Use Case, it will help 
assess its privacy consent processes. In PMRM, there are the following sections: 
 
- Develop use case description and high-level privacy analysis 
- Develop detailed privacy analysis 
- Identify functional services necessary to support privacy controls 
- Define the technical functionality and business processes supporting the selective 
services 
- Perform risk and/or compliance assessment 
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- Initiate iterative process 
- Operational definitions and glossary 
 
Ultimately, PMRM is an important diagnostic tool, which established a framework from 
which to analyze privacy impacts in an increasingly complex and interconnected 
environment. By its very nature PMRM it is proactive. The analysis of use cases helps to 
uncover gaps in existing processes and feeds into risk management models, driving 
internal change in industries. At best, PMRM can influence changes in policy and 
implementation, and have a role in future developments in the protection of private or 
sensitive information. 
 
3.2 – Methodology limitations 
A major hurdle for privacy protection is public trust. As the Literature Review states, in 
order for the public and policy makers to have confidence in the system there needs to be 
broad-based consent and understanding. PMRM, while long and technical, is not reader 
friendly and does not directly address the need for strong public confidence in the systems 
put in place. This methodology needs to be crafted with the laymen in mind. After all, 
without fundamental understanding and collaboration it becomes difficult to make 
impactful changes to improve existing systems. 
 
However, as privacy management is particularly important in healthcare, applying 
PMRM to consent processes in the HL7 use case will provide a good indication of what 
gaps exist in established processes to protect this very sensitive health information. 
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Ch 4 –PMRM Analysis of the HL7 Consent Directive Use Cases 
 
The sections below each represent a section of the Privacy Management Reference Model 
and Methodology. Throughout this chapter the use case and privacy analysis will be 
reviewed; functional support services will be identified; and a risk and compliance 
assessment will be conducted. Ultimately this will lead to a set of recommendations 
related to how and where HL7 can ultimately improve its processes to better protect and 
respond to privacy challenges. 
 
4.1 - Develop Use Case Description and High-Level Privacy Analysis 
4.1.1 Application and business process descriptions 
Use case description 
A non-profit organization, known as HL7 is dedicated to the development of international 
interoperability standards for health informatics. Participants in the HL7 organization 
provide a structure and platform for the “exchange, integration, sharing, and retrieval of 
electronic health information” (ANSI, 2013). HL7 works around the world with 
sanctioning bodies and standards developers to ultimately push for a supportive and 





The HL7 Consent Directive Use Cases are based on the 2008 recommendations from the 
American Health Information Community Consumer Empowerment Workgroup for the 
construction and utilization of privacy consent directives for individual health information 
(HL7, 2011, p. 1). 
 
At its core, these Use Cases is underpinned by the principal recommendation that the 
functional and technical capabilities are in place to control the “collection, access, use, 
and disclosure of individually identifiable health information (IIHI)” (HL7, 2011, p. 3). 
 
Use case inventory 
The following are a list of the HL7 Consent Directive Use Cases that will be reviewed as 
part of the analysis: 
- Grant control of the IIHI to Individuals 
- Manage Privacy Consent Directives 
- Provider System requests Privacy Consent Directive for a Client prior to 
disclosure 
- Provider requests IIHI 
- Information system masks Health Record Information based on Consumer 
preferences 
- Information system flags masked Health Record information 
- Provider amends IIHI based on consumer’s Privacy Consent Directive 
- Request privacy policies from organization or jurisdiction 
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- Provide electronic Privacy Consent Directive to a specific healthcare provider 
- Patient provides verbal Privacy Consent at point of service 
- Provider requests IIHI from another jurisdiction 
- Request for pre-fetch of DI exams 
- Provider override Privacy Consent Directive 
- Accounting of disclosures (addressed PASS audit) 
 
Systems: The Point of Service system (POS) that is connected to Health Record 
Information System used by providers that store electronic health records and disseminate 
information based on the specifications in place by the Privacy Consent Directive. A good 
example of the functions of a POS are given in Ontario’s eHealth Consent Directive 
Implementation Guide Ver. 1.01 (Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004). The 
POS would implement a consent management program responsible for consent directive 
management, enforcement, business, and technology operations. Consent management 
deals with creating, updating, deactivating, reinstating, and outputting patient directives. 
Enforcement covers, and is not limited to, application of patient consent rules, providing 
consent-related stakeholder notifications, administering temporary overrides (for example 
in emergency or mental health related situations), and obtaining consent status 
information. Technology operations refer to any function that supports the consent 
management solution, such as new lines of business integration, new technology 
integration, software process updates, technology performance monitoring and reporting. 
Examples of business operations, in the context of consent management, include policy 
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establishment and communication, change management, and business continuity 
processes in case of an online system failure. 
 
Legal and Regulatory: Jurisdictional authorities provide the regulatory environment to 
grant, withdraw, or withhold privacy consent options. Regulations also set default policies 
and classifications that specify when restrictions on the use of individually identifiable 
health information (IIHI) are not required.  
According to the Provincial Government, Nova Scotia’s Personal Health Information Act, 
it sets out to “govern the collection, use, disclosure, retention, disposal, and destruction of 
personal health information in a manner that recognizes both the right of individuals to 
protect their personal health information and the need of custodians to collect, use, and 
disclose personal health information to provide support and manage health care”. This 
includes penalties and fines for those who are not in compliance as determined by privacy 
officers (Personal Health Information Act, 2010). 
 
Additionally, the privacy of Nova Scotians is protected by the Freedom of Information 
and Protection of Privacy (FOIPOP) Act. The FOIPOP Act establishes parameters when 
it comes to the collection, use, and disclosure of individual information by public bodies 
and municipalities. This includes hospitals and the work they do with universities for 
research purposes. Like the Personal Health Information Act, FOIPOP defines what is 
considered appropriate for the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information in 
the conduct of the day-to-day activities of public bodies and municipal units. 
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The work of upholding the FOIPOP Act falls to the Review Officer, Dulcie McCallum; as 
well as a team which includes a Director, an Investigator, a Portfolio Officer, and an 
Intake Analyst. After all, without the ability to enforce these guidelines, the laws 
themselves would be meaningless. To that end, based on the work conducted by the 
FOIPOP team is vital to uphold system integrity and public confidence. 
To supplement the FOIPOP act, in 2006 the Nova Scotia Government passed the Personal 
Information International Disclosure Protection Act (PIIDPA), which extended protection 
and addressed concerns about foreign access and disclosure of the same information. 
PIIDPA prevents public bodies or municipalities from granting foreign access, sharing, or 
storing of personal information, unless necessary for the conduct of public duties. 
Violation of this Act carries with it substantial fines of up to $500,000. 
It is important to have a legislative framework in place that keeps up with the increasingly 
complex and interconnected nature of today’s data sharing, as well as providing an 
adequate penalty to ensure compliance. With FOIPOP, and in recent years the passage of 
the PHIA and PIIDPA, it is clear the Nova Scotia Government understands the 
importance of privacy protection and recognizes the challenges associated with 
maintaining the integrity of that important goal. 
 
Customer: PCDs vary depending on regulatory environment in a given jurisdiction. 
The customer is the patient or substitute decision maker. A substitute decision maker is 
someone (e.g. a parent of an underage child) who is authorized to consent on behalf of the 
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patient, to collection, use, or disclosure of the patient’s personal health information.   
 
4.2 Applicable privacy policies 
Privacy policy conformance criteria 
First, disclosure of IIHI must conform to existing guidelines put in place by the Nova 
Scotia’s (or other province or territory in which data is collected) Personal Health 
Information Act. Each province or territory, through its respective legislation sets out 
exceptions to what can be subject to a client’s Privacy Consent Directive, types of 
information that is not subject to the legislation. 
There are instances where implied consent may prove sufficient for the collection and 
sharing of data, however. Implied consent occurs when the client or patient seeks out the 
assistance of medical professionals, and the collection and utilization of personal health 
information is required to conduct the service. 
 
4.3 Initial privacy impact or assessment 
Assessment preparation 
Based on HL7’s recommendation, personal health records should have the technical 
versatility to allow the consumer to specify conditions for the collection, access, and 
distribution of certain aspects of their health information.  
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That is, when a patient or consumer of health care services goes to a provider, they are 
able to agree on the parameters on future usage of information and data collected from 
that visit. 
All of this must occur under the umbrella, however, of guidelines put in place by Nova 
Scotia’s Personal Health Information Act as it relates to granting consent for the 
collection and use of the individually identifiable health information. In this case, Nova 
Scotia’s PHIA states that consent can be expressed (through a PCD for example), 
implied, or deemed. In addition, consent can be revoked or limited and designated to 
others. It also puts limitations on the custodians of the data for how they implement these 
directives, for example it limits what can be collected to only what is necessary to receive 
the service, and if that could not be conducted using existing information. Other 
restrictions, such as encryptions prevent custodians from seeing information that is not 
relevant to the procedure. These ultimately determine the level of discretion the consumer 
has, and the level the provider can offer.  
Leakage of personal health information to unauthorized parties outside the circle of care 
for a patient is a risk of any system. These unauthorized parties may be employees in a 
hospital, other health service providers, dentists and their employees, insurers and their 
employees, or external hackers. The consent directives themselves may contain personal 
information that should not be disclosed. Access to PHI can be socially engineered with 
or without the presence of a computerized system. As most systems are a combination of 
human and computer processes, they are vulnerable to human-based, computer-based, 





4.4 - Develop detailed privacy analysis 
Identification of participants and systems, domains and domain owners, roles and 
responsibilities, touch points and data flows  
Identify participants 
- Patients/clients crafting Privacy Consent Directives. 
- Substitute decision makers for patients who are authorized to create, or modify 
consent directives 
- Provincial Legislators in Nova Scotia who crafted and passed PHIA. 
- Health care providers (and their appointed employees) who may access and use 
information in provision of care under implied consent 
- Personal Health Information Requestor can be a system or user who requests PHI. 
- Health Information System architects 
- System administrators 
- Privacy officers 
- Jurisdictional authority 
- Consent Registrar 





- Point of Service system  
- Consent directive management system (CDMS) and service 
- Electronic Health Record Infrastructure – provider’s information systems.  
- Consent Requester 
 
Identify privacy domains and owners 
Two major types of privacy domains exist: consenter (patient or substitute decision 
maker), and health providers, In the circle of care, multiple privacy domains exist. That is 
each health care provider (e.g. physician, specialist, physiotherapist, dentist, etc) has its 
own privacy domain. Individuals have the right to put limitations on the collection, use, 
and sharing of IIHI. This level of consent can be adjusted or revoked (within the 
parameters set forth by Nova Scotia’s PHIA). The personal health record repository is in 
the consenter’s domain. 
Providers: Point of service and provider information systems are put in place to ensure 
that the IIHI are protected as per the patient’s PCD and within the broader regulations set 
forth by the Nova Scotia Government’s PHIA. For now, we assume that the POS, HER, 
and the CDMS are in the same privacy domain, even though it would be more efficient, 
and less burdensome to the patient, to have a centralized CDMS to service all the 




Identify roles and responsibilities within a domain 
The system architects are responsible for creating the information systems responsible for 
protecting and effectively transferring the IIHI that operates within the regulations and 
PCDs put forward. 
System administrators (custodians) are to be sure that consent directives and EHRs are 
accurate and up to date. 
Consenters and Providers have the responsibility to know the framework that they operate 
in. Simply put, know their respective rights and responsibilities. 
 
Identify touch points 
The implementation of a client’s Privacy Consent Directive into the Point of Service 
System; a Provider’s request of IIHI; Amendments to IIHI based on changes to the PCD; 
and requests for IIHI from other jurisdictions are all points at which the data flows 
intersect with system and privacy domains.  
A client requests to create, view, and maintain their consent directives occur at the 
interface of the client and the consent directive management system. This interface is a 
touch point. A client may grant temporary override privilege to access her/his PHI under 
certain circumstances. Such granting occurs at the same client-consent directive 
management system touch point.  When notifications about consent directives are 
provided to the patients, other delivery touch points may come into play, for e.g. text, 
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email, snail mail, or telephone interfaces.  
A touch point will also exist between the consent directive management system and the 
policy system. The policy system would include the organization’s privacy and security 
policies management, including others for risk, audit etc. A further touch point is between 
a privacy officer and the consent directive management system. For example, the privacy 
officer may request reports on the management of patients’ consent directives.  Touch 
points also exist between the consent directive management system and the audit 
/logging/monitoring systems. 
Suppose a client falls ill when traveling to another province or country. It is plausible then 
that personal health information may be shared between different jurisdictions. The two 
jurisdictions may have dissimilar consent directive management systems. There will be 
touch points between the two systems that would need to harmonize the disparity 
according to some prior agreements or legislation equivalence rules that translate to new 
privacy controls on the data.  
 
Identify data flows 
Data flows closely follow the touch points, or times when interfacing between clients, the 
system, providers, and policy systems occur. 
Data flows from the client to the Privacy Consent Directive. From there, data flows 
between the PCD to the organization’s policy system; from the policy system to the 
29 
 
client’s personal health record. In addition, data flows from the provider to the personal 
health record, and in the transfer between providers. When such transfers occur, 
interfacing takes place with the PCD and the limitations placed on it by the systems.  
 
4.4.1 - Identify PI in use case privacy domains and systems 
Identify incoming PI 
Privacy Consent Directives provided by the client into the Provider’s Information System, 
as well as the input of more IIHI to the client’s Electronic Health Record. 
Identify internally generated PI 
Through client visits to the provider, additional information and data is generated for the 
Electronic Health Record. Consent directives may be changed as a result of any visit. 
New information may be generated through linking different data and generating a 
diagnosis for example. 
 
Identify outgoing PI 
Outgoing data occurs in the sending or transferring of Personal Health Records and IIHIs 





4,4.2 - Specify required privacy controls associated with PI 
Specify inherited privacy controls 
Regulations from Nova Scotia’s Personal Health Information Act dictates the conditions 
around where and when consent can be granted. Once established, the Provider’s 
Information System inherits privacy controls associated with the client’s Privacy Consent 
Directives. This establishes the conditions and restrictions upon which the provider can 
access, collect, use, or disclose the client’s Individually Identifiable Health Information 
(IIHI) within the client’s Personal Health Records (PHR). 
 
Specify internal privacy controls 
Internal privacy controls are largely dictated by existing regulations put in place by Nova 
Scotia’s Personal Health Information Act. In most cases these are a convergence of best 
practices among policy makers.  
Examples of these internal privacy controls are over-arching codes of conduct put in 
place by the providers, which largely follow laws and regulations put in place by the 
jurisdictional authority, in this case it would be the Nova Scotia Government’s Personal 
Health Information Act. In addition, the systems that the providers have to manage and 





Specify exported privacy controls 
Exported privacy controls come into play when sending Personal Health Records to other 
providers, and in some cases in other jurisdictions. The extent of the information 
contained in the Personal Health Record will be subject to the restrictions implemented 
by the client in the Privacy Consent Directive. Certain information may be masked based 
on the restrictions placed on the IIHI by the client, and then the filtered information is 
sent to the information requesters. The consent directive itself is thus an exported privacy 
control.  
 
4.5 - Identify functional services necessary to support privacy controls 
Services needed to implement the controls 
 
Identify the Services necessary to support operation of identified privacy controls 
Based on Incoming and Outgoing PI: 
Establishment of Privacy Consent Directive – the client establishes PCD by specifying 
restrictions on use of Personal Health Records. To make changes to the PCD, an 
Authenticated customer identity and Keywords need to be established in the system by 
the client.  
Accessing Personal Health Records – whether sent between providers or accessed 
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internally, information is encrypted when sent between providers or between 
jurisdictions. These access filter systems prevent certain information from being seen 
(cryptographically protected) by those not authorized by the Privacy Consent Directive. 
Thus security services, including identity management, authorization and encryption for 
both storage and transmission of PHI are essential. In addition, at minimum, audit, 
enforcement, notification, and usage services are also needed.  
 
4.6 - Define the technical functionality and business processes supporting the selected 
services 
Identify Functions Satisfying the Selected Services 
 
Identify the Functions that satisfy the selected Privacy Services 
The establishment or alteration of Privacy Consent Directive requires communication 
between the Provider’s Information System and Point of Service system that stores 
information on keywords entered by client to authorize changes. 
The PHRs accessed and transmitted by providers are encrypted to protect information 





4.7 - Perform Risk and/or Compliance Assessment 
Conduct risk assessment: a small example 
Penalties for breaches under the Nova Scotia Personal Health Information Act (PHIA) 
vary depending on whether it is an individual or corporation in violation, or what type of 
violation occurs. These penalties can either come in the form of jail time of up to $10,000 
and 6 months in prison for an individual, and up to a $50,000 fine for a corporation. 
Ultimately, the Courts will decide on the severity of the penalty based on its interpretation 
of the situation (Personal Health Information Act, 2010). Therefore, the risk incurred by 
providers and corporations that access data is that jail time or fines may be incurred if 
they do not take sufficient steps to protect privacy and respect existing guidelines. 
FOIPOP is another piece of legislation that applies to hospitals and also has penalties for 
privacy violations that occur as a result of poor management. Finally violation of the 
Personal Information International Disclosure Protection Act (PIIDPA) carries with it 
substantial fines of up to $500,000. These penalties imply that medical service providers 
need to have sophisticated privacy mechanisms in place, including state-of-the-art 
security systems to prevent unauthorized transmittal of data. If not, the access and 
transmission of encrypted PHRs or EHRs could be compromised.  
If the PCDs are not current based on the refinement of specifications made by the client, 
it is possible that the system will leak information that is not in accordance with patients’ 
consent directives and expectations. A proper risk assessment should be conducted using 
a methodology such as Carnegie Mellon’s OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, 
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Ch 5 – Findings of PMRM Analysis on Consent Directives 
 
The PMRM analysis on the consent processes associated with the collection, use, access 
and disclosure of individually identifiable health information provided a thorough 
analysis of the actors, systems, roles, responsibilities, functions, and vulnerabilities of the 
process outlined in the HL7 Consent Directive Use Case. From this, conclusions can be 
drawn on a larger scale and shed light on what still needs to be done to further protect and 
enhance privacy processes. 
 
Broadly speaking, the Privacy Consent Directive process is a vital step in the 
establishment of public recognition and understanding of how individuals’ personal 
health information is used and shared. Without it, those who advocate for the protection 
of privacy and seek to enhance existing regulations and systems are simply doing so on a 
conceptual basis. Without client interaction or direct involvement it becomes hard to 
generate public support or lobby effectively. It takes an understanding of relevant actors, 
data flows, and system specifications to truly understand how effectively (or 
ineffectively) personal information is being protected. By putting the onus on the public 
to specify his or her own Privacy Consent Directives, more attention is put on this 
important subject. 
 
The PMRM analysis did an effective job of outlining the technical processes associated 
with Consent Directive Management Systems. That is, the flow of data between 
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consenters and providers, between providers, and between jurisdictions. It is ultimately a 
matter of the system integrity that will determine how effective the safeguards like 
authenticated consumer identities and encryptions are. That is a difficult question to 
answer with the PMRM analysis, and one better posed to computer scientists and system 
engineers. The dynamic nature of technological develop assures us, however, that newer 
more powerful, efficient and secure systems will be within reach in future. 
 
Another element of the Privacy Consent process that showed through in the analysis was 
the complicating role played by jurisdictional authorities. As one of the main actors in 
PMRM, the jurisdictional authorities (regulating bodies & governments) had different 
privacy policies as they relate to individually identifiable health information. This makes 
the transmission of data between providers and clients in different jurisdictions 
complicated and uncertain. With different definitions and interpretations of what can be 
contained within a Privacy Consent Directive, it makes it difficult for clients to 
understand and more complex for systems to protect certain information when data flows 
between jurisdictions. This proved a glaring area for future work to take place in order to 
streamline the processes in an increasingly integrated health environment. 
 
The over-arching goal for all stakeholders involved in the protection of personal health 
data should be the same: to simplify and protect the systems responsible for the collection 
and transmission of individually identifiable health information. It is safe to say this goal 
is a work in progress. From a legislative and technological standpoint, developments will 
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continue to smooth out the wrinkles that currently exist within the process. It underscores 
the importance of all stakeholders coming together to ensure that those sharing common 
goals can pull in the same direction, as it is a multifaceted approach to the simplifying 
and strengthening these systems so privacy protection can continue to be enhanced. 
 
The PMRM analysis was effective at aggregating the relevant players and issues 
associated with the Privacy Consent Directives outlined in the HL7 use case. These 
conclusions provide good insight into the issues and vulnerabilities faced in the protection 












Ch 6 – Summary 
 
The digitization of health records put increased scrutiny on the issue of privacy 
management in healthcare. While leading to improvements in the aggregation, efficiency, 
and accuracy of data flows, the issue of how best to balance personal discretion and 
access is still far from settled. 
 
There are many stakeholders involved in the digitization of health records and all need to 
do a better job coming together to ensure systems and regulations match. Interoperability 
needs to be at the core of future efforts to improve delivery. This means that health care 
providers and governments need to work together to ensure that uniform standards are put 
in place and existing silos are eliminated. This is not only required from a data flow 
perspective, but as costs pressures continue to rise governments will be forced to look 
more closely at regional cooperation in delivery. 
 
The dynamic nature of technological development will mean that moving forward the 
focus should continue to be on the simplification and increased effectiveness of security 
mechanisms associated with new technology. Provider Information Management Systems 




6.1 – Future work 
As interoperability is a key element of privacy management in healthcare, the attention of 
future works should be focused on efforts at synchronizing legislation and systems related 
to the privacy of personal health records. 
 
The PMRM analysis does not allow for in-depth comparison or review of competing 
health information management systems. Without specifications or a comparison of 
competing systems provided in the HL7 use case, it is difficult to look into privacy 
protection from a technical basis. A look into technologies associated with privacy 
protection would be valuable moving forward, particularly due to the fast paced evolution 
of data sharing technologies in the 21st century. 
 
There is still work to be done to improve privacy protection, particularly as it relates to 
personal health records. Further analysis of the technological and regulatory 
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